In the present study I use spatial voting model to assess the importance of the left-right and immigration issue dimensions on electoral behavior in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. My findings indicate that distances between parties and voters on both left-right and immigration dimensions do significantly influence voting choice in all three countries, although effect of the latter is substantially lower. I also demonstrate that voting for the niche parties, and especially for the radical right, is much stronger related to the immigration issue than voting for the mainstream parties, both center-left and center-right ones. Finally, my analysis demonstrates that positional spatial voting model shows a good degree of stability even under imperfect measurement of policy preferences. In conclusion, I discuss implications of my findings for the research on new political issues and niche parties.
Emergence of the new dimensions of electoral competition represents a popular topic in contemporary political science. 2 Interest to it can be explained with its particular importance to the field. Emergence of politically relevant issues determines formation of new political parties, even though their electoral success is largely dependent on the institutional setting (Harmel and Robertson 1985) . In a two-party system, such as the U.S., development of a new issue dimension can change political positions and electoral bases of the existing parties (Carmines and Stimson 1986) . Speaking more generally, changes in the number and content of electorally significant issues lead to the important transformations of political space.
Such changes can be easily demonstrated on the example of Western European politics after the World War II. Up to the late 1960s, West European party systems reflected "frozen" social cleavages which remained surprisingly stable since the beginning of the XX century (Lipset and Rokkan 1967) . However, in the 1970s this system began to experience profound and long-lasting transformations. Ronald Inglehart (1971) was one of the first to predict emergence of a new political conflict based on values and lifestyle rather than on preferences with regard to social class and economic policy. This prediction largely fulfilled in 1980s when environmental movement and the green parties appeared as important players in West European politics (Mueller-Rommel 1985) . Herbert Kitschelt (1988) linked this breakthrough to the wider phenomenon of the "left-libertarian" parties which he defined through opposition to the primacy of economic policy and, instead, emphasis on issues such as individual autonomy and equality.
Nowadays concerns related to immigration and integration, which also cannot be easily projected on the traditional conflict between left and right, represent one of the most important issue 2 Generally, in political science literature the term dimension is used to denote a combination of several related political issues. For instance, sociocultural dimension is perceived to involve such issues as abortion, gay rights, and euthanasia. In the present paper I use the two dimensions based on single issues (left-right conflict and immigration respectively) and, therefore, use the two terms interchangeably.
dimensions in West European politics. It is a nearly universal perception that salience of this particular issue led to the emergence and electoral success of the radical right parties throughout the European continent. Therefore, both libertarian-left and radical right parties are often commonly labeled as "niche parties" (Adams et al. 2006; Meguid 2005) which differ from the mainstream parties by focusing their appeal on a particular novel political issue.
The present study aims to advance the debate regarding the relationship between new issue dimensions and parties' strategies by focusing on the role of immigration in three 
Issue Dimensions in West European Politics
Recent scholarship observes that issues gradually become more important in West
European politics (Green-Pedersen 2007) and that this process is reflected by the parallel decline of cleavage-based voting (Best 2011) . However, the exact number of issue dimensions remains a subject of dispute. The debate was largely pioneered by Kitschelt (1995) who suggested that political space in developed democracies is defined by the two dimensions, socialist-capitalist and libertarian-authoritarian. More recent studies based on expert surveys and analyses of party manifestos demonstrate existence of at least three issue dimensions including economy, social issues, and attitudes to the EU . Furthermore, the exact number of politically relevant issues can be even bigger depending on the particular country context (Albright 2010; Benoit and Laver 2006) .
There are at least two reasons why the discussion regarding the number of issue dimensions and potential correlations between them is important. First, it has important implications for the relationship between structure of party competition and observed voters' preferences. For instance, Kriesi et al. (2006) Taagepera and Grofman (1985) , there is a nearly linear dependency between the number of salient issues in a society and an effective number of parties in a political system. The exact nature of this relationship, however, remains unclear. One explanation, which follows the line of political sociology, links emergence of the new parties to the changes in social cleavages and growing diversity of interest groups (Inglehart 1971; Harmel and Robertson 1985) . Alternative logic emphasizes the role of political elites in promoting new issues and strategy of "issue entrepreneurship" pursued by the losing parties (Carmines and Stimson 1986; De Vries and Hobolt 2012) . At the same time both approaches agree that success of a niche party largely depends on its ability to campaign on the issue which is least advantageous to its mainstream counterparts.
Left-Right Dimension
It is interesting that the left-right dimension, which can be traced back to the French Revolution, remains the basic tool to operationalize political competition in the beginning of the XXI century. Politics in most societies is still habitually described by reference to the traditional left-right conflict, even though its specific components can be different across countries (Benoit and Laver 2006, 126-28) . Wide popularity of the left-right dimension can be attributed to both its simplicity for formal modeling and perceived familiarity to voters (Albright 2010) . However, exact content of "left" and "right" ideologies was never fixed-for instance, it changed dramatically since the XIX century-but nowadays it is normally associated with economic policies (Huber and Inglehart 1995) . Benoit and Laver (2006, 141-44) report that together with moral issues preferences with regard to the economic policy (lower taxes vs. higher public spending) explain up to two thirds of variance in left-right positioning.
A specific question concerns the relationship between left-right position and party identification among voters. Inglehart and Klingemann (1976) reported that individual's selfdescription as "left" or "right" depends on both ideology and identification with a particular party. This claim is clearly based on the U.S.-originated model of electoral behavior which asserts primacy of party identification in voting choice (Campbell et al. 1960) . However, it was demonstrated that in the European context party identification is secondary with regard to voting choice and therefore reflects rather than causes electoral behavior (Thomassen 1992 ). Therefore, it is possible to suggest that personal ideological preferences remain an important basis of voters' left-right positioning even when party identification is also accounted for (see Huber 1989) .
Immigration Dimension
Unlike the long-lasting conflict based on social class and economic preferences, which is 
Analytical Model
Analytical model used in the present study is based on the rational choice approach to political behavior as formulated by Anthony Downs (1957) . With regard to voting it rests on the idea that the primary goal of an election in a democratic country is to select a government. As a result, interests of an individual voter are defined by a possibility to derive utility from governmental policies. Therefore, as soon as a voter has policy preferences, rational behavior dictates to vote for a candidate whose policies are closest to the voter's ideal. Besides this general axiom of voters' rationality, my model involves a number of important assumptions which are derived from the mathematical formulation of a spatial voting model developed by Davis, Hinich, and Ordeshook (1970 (Jesse 2009 ) and even outperforms rival models such as one of directional voting (Westholm 1997 ).
An essential problem related to the spatial voting model concerns the fact that the literature shows no agreement with regard to the shape of the utility loss function defined by distance between a voter and a candidate. Most studies, both theoretical and empirical ones, use quadratic policy distances to estimate the loss function (Adams, Merrill, and Grofman 2005; Davis, Hinich, and Ordeshook 1970; Rivers 1988) . At the same time, some authors argue that absolute distances should be preferred (see Westholm 1997, 871-72) . Furthermore, recent empirical contributions indicate that the power of the loss function fluctuates between 1 and 2 depending on the context (Berinsky and Lewis 2007; Jackson, Mach, and Markowski 2010) .
Therefore, I directly estimate power of the loss function instead of accepting one of the "default"
variants. I also add the interaction between the two distances in order to take into account the fact that they can be not perfectly orthogonal.
As a result, my analytical model can be represented as follows:
β 0j -basic utility of voting for party j; β k -coefficients; q -power of the loss function; lrdist ij -distance between voter i and party j on the left-right dimension; imdist ij -distance between voter i and party j on the immigration dimension; ε ij -individual error.
Another necessary adjustment of the classical spatial voting model concerns possible heterogeneity of the sample which results from the possibility that relative importance of the dimensions can vary across the voters (Jackson 1991; Rivers 1988 ). Such differences can be caused by the fact that in their electoral strategies parties attach unequal weight to various issues.
Theoretically this phenomenon is best explained by the approach known as the "issue ownership" (Petrocik 1996) . Issue ownership approach assumes that each party has a distinct 
Variables
The dependent variable of my study, party choice, was nominal as it consisted of the unique codes for the parties included in the analysis. It was constructed using the countryspecific ESS questions in which respondents were asked about the party they voted for at the most recent national election. Two main explanatory variables, left-right distance and immigration distance, were calculated as absolute values of differences between parties and voters on the two respective dimensions. As a result, each voter obtained a number of scores which show his/her distances to each party in the country. Party positions on both issue dimensions were taken from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey. Respondent position on the left-right scale was based on their self-placement which was included in the ESS as one of the questions.
Respondent position on immigration was assessed as an average of three survey questions asking about impact of immigration on respondent's country. All positional variables were measured using the 11-point scale ranging from 0 to 10 (so that 10 means most right and most antiimmigrant) and, therefore, were fully comparable.
Method
In order to estimate the effects of respectively left-right and immigration policy distances on voting I chose a discrete choice logistic model. These types of models are extensively used in economics, especially in transportation research, but less so in political science even though they represent a nearly perfect tool for estimation of spatial voting models (Thurner 2000) . For the estimation procedure I employed BIOGEME, free open source software developed by Michel
Bierlaire. It was specifically designed for the estimation of discrete choice models and, therefore, has two important advantages over traditional statistical packages. Through the option of "generalized utility" it permits specification of nonlinear models which is extremely important for the direct estimation of the loss function power.
Results

Denmark
For all countries, I estimated, first, a general model with uniform utility loss coefficients and, then, a party-specific model in which utility loss coefficients were allowed to vary across different parties. Results of the two models for Denmark are represented in Table 1 . General model demonstrates that an average Danish voter takes into account both left-right and immigration distances in a voting choice but the former has more weight in a decision than the latter. Insignificance of an interaction between the two distances indicates that their effects on voting behavior are effectively independent.
--- Table 1 
Norway
Results of the general model and the party-specific model for Norway are represented in Table 2 . The former shows that in Norway both left-right and immigration dimensions affect electoral behavior and, as well as in Denmark, the "old" issue is more important than the "new"
one. Interaction of the two suggests that they are significantly related but the magnitude is relatively low.
--- Table 2 
Sweden
Results for the Sweden are represented in Table 3 . General model indicates that, as well as in other two Scandinavian countries, both left-right and immigration dimensions are significant in explaining electoral behavior with the former being stronger than the latter. Effects of the two show some interdependence because interaction between the two appears to be statistically significant.
--- Table 3 about here ---
Party-specific results demonstrate that effects of the left-right distances, while being nearly equal for most parties, are much less important for the voters of radical right Sweden
Democrats. Immigration distances affect only voting for the parties of the left-wing coalition, whereas they showed no significant effects for the center-right parties. Sweden Democrats, in turn, demonstrate a pattern which is common for the radical right parties in Scandinavia, since voting for them was primarily motivated by the immigration issue, whereas effect of the traditional left-right conflict is substantially lower and less significant.
Discussion and Conclusion
In this section I account for the implications of this study. I begin from the summary of An essential limitation of my study is related to the imperfect measurement of distances between voters and parties. Most importantly, preferences for restrictive immigration policies among the voters were measured indirectly through the perception that immigration has negative effect on their countries' economy and culture. Another point of criticism can concern the fact that the expert scores, which I employed to estimate party positions on the two dimensions, are not necessarily fully comparable to the scales used by voters to evaluate parties. On the other hand, combination of information from different sources can help to avoid the problem of projection whereby voters attach their own attitudes to liked candidates (see Krosnick 1988, 198 Norway, represent an important exception from the proximity logic. I found that respondents are more likely to vote for these parties if they are farther rather than closer to them on the immigration policy dimension. Such tendency to support a party which is more distant from a voter on one of the ideological dimensions is effectively opposite to the logic beyond the spatial voting model and, more broadly, to the rational choice framework. There are two potential explanations for this controversial finding. First, it can be caused by the imperfect measurement of policy positions which was discussed above. It should be noted, however, that this discrepancy was found only for the moderate right parties whereas proximity logic worked relatively well for all other party families. Therefore, there is a possibility that my finding can have a substantive explanation related to a specific place of moderate right parties in contemporary West European politics.
In conclusion, I would like to stress that the number of questions posed by my study is larger than the number of answers it provides. Therefore, more research is needed to properly address the topics of spatial voting and issue ownership in multiparty systems with regard to new political issues and niche parties. Most importantly, it is necessary to increase the sample of countries and the number politically relevant issue dimensions in order to understand whether findings presented in this study can be generalized. N = 6,117 . Power of the loss function is 1.5 in both models SE = standard error. LR = likelihood-ratio * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 
